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BOOK REVIEW
The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial. By Marvin E. Frankel & Gary
P. Naftalis. New York: Hill and Wang. 1977. Pp. 148. $8.95.
The grand jury is an investigative institution of awesome power., It may
issue subpoenas at will, often of the notorious "forthwith" variety, requiring
the appearance, sometimes on unreasonably short notice and at great incon-
venience and expense, of witnesses who may be as far removed from the
grand jury room as Hawaii from New York. When the witness enters the
grand jury chamber, he must confront, without the presence of counsel, at
least sixteen (of possibly twenty-three) strangers, and a trained, skilled, and
sometimes hostile interrogator. Although in some districts every word the
witness utters is stenographically transcribed, ordinarily he is not entitled to a
transcript of his testimony, nor does he have to be told that he has a
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination or that anything he says
may be used against him. Even though he may himself be the target of the
grand jury's investigation, he need not be so advised. Should he refuse to
answer questions regarded as proper, he may be cited and punished for
contempt of the grand jury and incarcerated until he answers or the term of
the grand jury expires. In short, the modem grand jury hearing is, for the
average witness, a harrowing ordeal. 2
Recognition of these problems has caused some to urge the complete
abolition of the institution; others have for some time sought its reform. The
authors of The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial espouse the latter as the
better course. Federal Judge Frankel and former Assistant United States
Attorney Naftalis3 bring their ability, experience and expertise to the composi-
tion of this work, which is timely, informative and intellectually stimulating.
It is recommended for reading by lawyers and laymen alike. The great value
of this book lies in the fact that it presents with thoroughness and clarity the
changes that have been suggested for our grand jury system, the arguments
for and against those suggestions, together with a forthright statement of the
authors' position, and some independent proposals of their own. It would
exceed the reasonable compass of this review to comment upon all these
recommendations; therefore, only those regarded as perhaps ineffective or
ill-advised are considered.
Selection of Grand Jurors
It will come as a surprise to some that federal grand jurors are selected "at
random." The principal concern seems to be that there be compliance with
the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 4 which requires that grand jurors
1. M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, The Grand Jury- An-Institution on Trial 3-6 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Frankel & Naftalis]. The discussion throughout concerns the federal grand jury, since the
authors deal primarily with that body.
2. See generally Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 1, at 18-32.
3. Judge Frankel sits in the Southern District of New York. Mr. Naftalis served there
officially and is now a private practitioner.
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1861-1869, 1871 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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"[be] selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community" and
forbids their exclusion from service "on account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin or economic status."s Accordingly, the names of prospective
grand jurors are chosen from voter registration lists; and, of these, a particu-
lar panel is selected in a typical lottery fashion, by drawing their names from
a drum. While it is true that those tentatively selected as federal grand jurors
are questioned regarding certain matters, such as age, residence in the
district, ability to speak, read, and write English, and the absence of
disabling physical infirmities (for example, bad eyesight or poor hearing),
apparently no questions are asked bearing upon native intelligence, educa-
tion, experience, or integrity.
6
A conspicuous omission in the selection procedure is the absence of any
check on the truth of the answers given, none of which are made under oath.
For instance, jurors must have no record of felony convictions. 7 The authors
do not state whether the court or prosecutor has independent knowledge
whether such convictions exist, or if any independent investigation is made of
the facts. Nor do they mention misdemeanor convictions or disposition of
persons who have been arrested, or indicted, but acquitted after trial, or
absolved by the court's dismissal of the charges against them.8 Surely, these
circumstances should have a direct and material bearing upon the prospective
juror's ability to perform, without prejudice, what the authors correctly
describe as the sole function of a grand jury: "to determine if there is sufficient
evidence to warrant putting the subject of an investigation on trial."9
5. Id. §§ 1861-1862; see Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 1, at 41-42.
6. Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 1, at 44.
7. Id.
8. Lest it be thought that these considerations are far-fetched, some years ago it was
discovered in panelling a special grand jury that a number of those chosen "at random" to serve
had committed perjury in answering two questions put to them under oath: (1) "Have you ever
been criminally prosecuted?" and (2) "Have you ever had trouble with the authorities?" No check
had ever been made as to the accuracy of these responses.
Investigation disclosed that, of the first 100 prospective grand jurors, five had been convicted
of some offense; four had been arrested though not indicted; several had been found guilty of
disorderly conduct; and many had long records of traffic violations. Subsequently, six of these
were indicted for perjury in the first degree and four for perjury in the second degree. Of the six,
five pleaded guilty. Of the four indicted for perjury in the second degree, only one was tried, and
he was acquitted.
Further investigation of the same panel disclosed that the grand jury list included many
individuals who proved to be unfit to serve by reason of false statements made in civil
proceedings, larceny from employers who had been persuaded not to prosecute, suspicious proofs
of claim in insurance cases, and mental incapacity known to the individuals' families.
As a result, the New York legislature enacted a statute (Judiciary Law, Article 17) applicable to
all counties having a population of 100,000 or more, providing for more thorough checks upon
the qualifications of both grand and petit jurors. In 1941 the New York Legislature enacted a
further provision whereby it became necessary for each prospective grand juror to be finger-
printed at the time of being examined as to his qualifications. See J. Amen, Report of Kings
County Investigation: 1938-1942, at 14, 34-39.
9. Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 1, at 19.
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In view of this disturbing laxity, the authors' suggestion that a grand jury
be given adequate instructions by the judge with respect to their broad
authority and duties to their fellow citizens' ° seems to miss the mark. If, as
the authors urge, grand juries must exercise independence in the performance
of their functions, much more attention should be paid to their qualifications
and verification made of the basic prerequisites of intelligence, experience,
and integrity. At the very least, a thorough check should be made into the
criminal records of all prospects, and to facilitate this, their fingerprinting
should be required.
Pretrial Testing of the Sufficiency of Grand Jury Testimony
Early in the book, reference is made to the fact that federal courts deny an
indicted defendant the right to test before trial the sufficiency of the grand
jury evidence upon which the indictment is based." Continuance of this
long-standing practice is favored by the authors, except possibly in egregious
cases of grand jury irresponsibility. This rule obtains even though, theoreti-
cally, the grand jury evidence must be sufficient to establish aprimafacie case
that there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused committed it.' 2 In fact, the required "probable cause" may
be properly found, even where all the grand jury evidence is incompetent,' 3
as with mere hearsay, or some of it was obtained by unconstitutional means,
such as an illegal wiretap."
These standards (or lack of them) of course remain largely academic, since
the defendant may not have them effectively applied by an appropriate
motion to dismiss the indictment before trial.' s It is said in favor of the
present rule that there should be only one trial-the one in open court-to
determine the sufficiency of the evidence. 16 But the question arises, and
regrettably is left unanswered: Why should the defendant be put to the mental
and emotional trauma of an indictment and the harassment and expense of a
trial when the accusation to be tried is based upon "evidence" universally
recognized as incompetent and therefore, in legal contemplation, no evidence
at all?
Other arguments seem even less convincing. For example, the authors say
that (1) rules of evidence are designed to govern only proceedings in a trial
10. Id. at 121-22.
11. Id. at 27; see, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974); United States v.
Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 n.3 (1966) (illegally seized evidence); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.
339, 349 (1958) (evidence obtained in violation of petitioners' fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (hearsay testimony); Holt
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910) (incompetent evidence).
12. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
687-88 (1972).
13. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564 (1976).
14. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-51 (1974). But see id. at 355 n.11.
15. See cases cited note 11 supra.
16. Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 1, at 26.
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court; and (2) evidentiary questions may be properly raised only by objections
(those not objected to become unobjectionable) and there is no one (no defense
attorney) present in the grand jury room to object. 17 This position seems at
best facetious. Nor would the problem be solved by permitting the defense
counsel's presence in the grand jury room, for the authors, while favoring
this, would limit the attorney's presence to the period of his client's testimony
before the grand jury, and even then would not permit him to object to
prosecution questions that are objectionable.' 8
The contention is made that permitting a pretrial test of the sufficiency of
grand jury testimony might increase the danger that the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings would be breached. But this eventuality does not appear to have
occurred in the State of New York, for instance, where the law provides for
an inspection of grand jury minutes limited to a court alone in its considera-
tion of a defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss a pending indictment against
him for insufficiency of proof.' 9 Here the people are protected against an
adverse decision of the motion, since the prosecutor has the right of appeal
from an order of dismissal. 20 No cogent reason appears why the New York
rule should not be adopted federally, since it provides fair and needed
protection to the accused and does not prejudice the legitimate interests of the
prosecution.
A "Bill of Rights" for Witnesses
The dependence of the grand jury on the prosecutor is almost routine, since
it is hardly avoidable. He determines what evidence is presented to them-the
amount and the kind. He may, if he wishes, exclude from their consideration
any exculpatory facts in his possession. His treatment, or mistreatment of
witnesses, is unrestrained. When the evidence is all in, the grand jury,
composed as it is of laymen, looks to the prosecutor to tell it whether the
evidence is sufficient to show that a crime has been committed, what
particular crime it is, and if the accused is prima facie guilty of it. Although,
theoretically, the ultimate decision as to whether or not to indict is the grand
jury's since the prosecutor must absent himself from the room when they
vote, in reality the determination is the prosecutor's.
The authors review various suggestions made to remedy these conditions,
some their own, which they include in "a bill of rights for witnesses." A
number of these are very much in order: that regular reports on the work of
federal grand juries should be made, presumably by the district attorneys to
the Attorney General and by him to the Congress and to the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts; that complete stenographic transcripts
should be made of all that goes on in the grand jury room, except the grand
jurors' private deliberations; that a prospective defendant, known as such,
17. Id.
18. Id. at 124.
19. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 210.20, 210.30 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1977); see People v.
Howell, 3 N.Y.2d 672, 148 N.E.2d 867, 171 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1958).
20. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 450.20 (McKinney 1975).
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called as a grand jury witness, should be advised of his situation, and that no
witness should be summoned to testify if the prosecutor knows beforehand
that if called, he will invoke his privilege against self-incrimination; that a
prospective defendant, if not called, should have the right to appear voluntar-
ily at his request and present his version of the facts, although he should not
have the right to call exculpatory witnesses on his own behalf, nor should the
prosecutor be required to present such evidence; and that press conferences
and "other celebrations" to mark the issuance of indictments, with all the
fanfare of Kleig light exposure, are no proper business of prosecutors. 2 1
Two additional "reforms" require special consideration. One is the sugges-
tion that "a witness should be permitted to have a lawyer with him in the
grand jury room to advise him there and then of his rights and liabilities. '22
The other deals with measures intended to afford additional cover to the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings. 23
The authors would only favor the presence of counsel for a witness who
could afford one, but they also support a law providing a lawyer at public
cost to any grand jury witness who claims he cannot afford to retain one. At
the same time, they have considered and found wanting, although not
"weightless," the argument that permitting a lawyer for the witness to be
present would delay and obstruct the grand jury's work. 24 They respond that
the remedy is not to exclude the attorney altogether, but to limit his role in the
grand jury room strictly to advising the witness of his rights. 25
There are those who agree with this position, among them the prestigious
American Bar Association; 26 and pending congressional bills would enact
enabling legislation. 27 This reviewer finds himself in disagreement with this
respectable body of opinion. The feared legalistic obstructionism and inter-
minable delay, not to mention the heavy financial burden that would be
involved, buttress this view. While it is true that an attempt will be made to
limit the attorney's role, the question will certainly arise in particular cases of
how far he may go and whether he has exceeded permissible limits. This
would require at least one, and probably repeated, applications to the court,
involving the time and energies of the prosecutor, witness' counsel, the
district judge presiding, and the grand jury stenographer, plus perhaps a
transcript (assuming it is required and available) of the pertinent grand jury
21. Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 1, at 121-28. Many of these proposals are embodied in a
resolution approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its meeting In
Chicago on August 9, 1977, which contains 25 suggested legislative changes in the present grand
jury system. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1977, at Al, col. 3.
22. Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 1, at 123-24.
23. Id. at 132-35.
24. Id. at 124.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 4, 1977). Similar legislation has
been pending at least since September 28, 1976. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 28, 1976) (reform
of the grand jury system).
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proceedings. In the meantime, the members of the grand jury would either be
held in idleness or excused pending a decision which may, in close cases, be
reserved. As a consequence, the grand jury hearing will be transformed into
an adversary proceeding, with a pretrial trial of tangential issues far removed
from the substantive matters under grand jury inquiry.
Nor does this take into account questions of appeal: Will there be a right in
the witness or the prosecutor to appeal an adverse ruling by the court? If so,
further prolonged delay will be required. If not, what is there to prevent an
arbitrary judicial disposition of the matter? And what of grand jury secrecy
and unwanted publicity? Is the judicial hearing to be held in open court or in
camera? If the former, are the minutes of the pertinent grand jury proceeding
to be read aloud or in silence? And, in either case, what is to prevent an avid
press from reporting or detecting grand jury material?
As for grand jury secrecy, to permit the presence of each witness' counsel in
the grand jury room is to create a myriad of possible "sources" for the news
media. Grand jury "leaks" can hardly be prevented now, when only the
witness is legally free to reveal his testimony. Is his attorney to be free to do so
also, or is he to be silenced? And how stifling will the muffler prove to be, so
long as reporters continue, as they will, to go to jail for contempt before
revealing their "confidential source?"
Finally, one may question how more effective counsel will be inside the
grand jury room than he is now, as he is permitted to be, just outside it. All
he may do in either instance is to advise the witness of his rights. Objection is
raised to requiring a witness to leave the grand jury room to consult with
counsel. This has been characterized as "a ludicrous situation that can cast
doubt on a witness's veracity. ' 28 But will not continuous consultation with
the counsel in the grand jury room raise similar, if not stronger, doubts? For
example, suppose counsel instructs the witness not to answer in the presence
of the grand jury. Will they form no adverse opinions as to his openness and
veracity?
None of the foregoing considerations takes into account the case of the
witness who cries "poverty." How and by whom is his claim to be deter-
mined? Certainly, the fact of his indigence should be thoroughly proved
before counsel is employed at public expense.
These questions are not raised with any specificity by the book under
review. The suggestion that the presence of counsel be permitted in the grand
jury room is made with the laudable intent of giving the witness much-needed
protection. 29 At the same time, all will agree that the important work of
grand juries must go on, and that in this instance, as in others, "justice
delayed is justice denied."
The necessity for striking a balance between considerations of grand jury
expedition and efficiency, on the one hand, and protection of witnesses on the
28. Richard E. Gerstein, Esq., quoted in N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1977, at Al, col. S. Mr.
Gerstein served as chairperson of the committee which drafted the proposals adopted by the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates, referred to in note 21 supro.
29. Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 1, at 124.
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other, leads this reviewer to suggest that, instead of opening the doors of the
grand jury room to attorneys imbued with the spirit of advocacy, a Federal
magistrate be assigned by the court to preside over the empanelling and
proceedings of the grand jury. In this way, the hearing would remain
nonadversary and yet the witness' rights would be protected.
Should this proposal be adopted, it is suggested that:
First. The magistrate would preside over the selection of the grand jury.
He would question prospects about their qualifications and see to it that the
selection methods are fair and nondiscriminatory and that a thorough check is
made of the presence or absence of a criminal record.
Second. The magistrate would hear all excuses from service advanced by
prospective grand jurymen.
Third. The signature of a magistrate would be required on all grand jury
subpoenas for their validity. Before affixing his signature, he would have to
be satisfied that the subpoena was for a legitimate grand jury purpose (not
merely for harassment), and that it was reasonable in terms of time and
distance.
Fourth. The magistrate would charge the grand jury as to its powers and
its independence in sifting the evidence and deciding who shall be indicted
and who not.
Fifth. The magistrate would be present in the grand jury room while the
jury is in session. As the body took up the investigation of a particular case,
the magistrate would charge the jury on the applicable criminal statute.
Should the jury, during the development of evidence, have questions, the
magistrate would undertake to answer them.
Sixth. The presence of the magistrate in the grand jury room should itself
be a salutary restraint on an overzealous prosecutor; but, if not, the magis-
trate would be empowered to intervene and guide the interrogation of a
particular witness, so far as necessary. In sum, he would see that each witness
was fairly treated.
Seventh. On completion of the evidence, the magistrate would again
address the grand jury, instructing them as to the relevant penal provisions
involved and the quantum of evidence required by law for a prima facie case.
Eighth. The magistrate and prosecutor would withdraw from the grand
jury room during the jurors' deliberations. If the grand jury had questions the
magistrate and the prosecutor would return to the grand jury room, where the
magistrate would give further instructions.
Ninth. Should the grand jury vote an indictment, magistrate, prosecutor,
and jurors would repair to a designated courtroom where the indictment
would be presented.
Tenth. The magistrate would be accountable at all times to the appropriate
district judge for any alleged misperformance of his duties.
In this way, it is believed the dual purpose of preservation of grand jury




The authors describe the prevailing grand jury "secrecy" as "too much and
too little." 30 They assert there is presently an excessive regard for secrecy in
that witnesses are denied grand jury minutes of their testimony, except that, if
one is called as a prosecution trial witness, counsel for the defense may have a
transcript of the witness' grand jury testimony for the purpose of cross-
examination. They suggest, rather vaguely, that "subject to safeguards of
scope and timing . . . grand jury transcripts be far more freely available to
defendants."3 1 Presumably, only defendants would be given such transcripts.
However, it seems to this reviewer that every witness before the grand jury
should be given access to a transcript of his grand jury testimony, but only if
and when he is called as a trial witness, whether for prosecution or defense. It
is common practice that prosecution witnesses are given access to their grand
jury testimony to refresh their recollection and to avoid substantial contradic-
tion and divergencies between their grand jury and trial testimony. Why
should not the same assistance be accorded a defense witness who has given
grand jury testimony?
Contrary to the authors' view, it does not seem either wise or necessary to
supply any witness, prosecution or defense, with a transcript of his testimony
as a matter of course. To do so would open wider the door to public disclosure
of grand jury proceedings. On the other hand, it appears only fair that any
prospective trial witness be permitted to read his grand jury testimony (but
not to copy it), at a time reasonably in advance of the trial, but not before
then.
As to grand jury "leaks," the authors join the majority of critics in
deploring them.32 They find the principal culprits to be the prosecutors and
the media. They favor pending congressional legislation which would make it
a federal misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $500 or six months'
imprisonment to reveal grand jury activities; and where the disclosure is
motivated by financial remuneration or aimed at influencing the grand jury's
proceedings, punishable by a fine of $20,000 or imprisonment for five years. 33
A further suggestion is made that the victim of unauthorized leaks might be
given a statutory cause of action for the recovery of money without proof of
"actual damages," or for punitive damages. However, the authors would not,
on first amendment grounds, impose similar sanctions on the news media. 34
Both remedies are likely to be ineffective, for they would require proof of
the unprovable. To begin with, although grand jurors, 3" the prosecutor, and
30. Id. at 132.
31. Id. at 133.
32. Id. at 133-34.
33. Id. at 134 & n.66.
34. Id. at 134.
35. Grand jurors themselves have unlawfully disclosed grand jury testimony. See Innes
v. Cosgrove, 177 Misc. 464, 30 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. CL 1941), aff'd, 263 App. Div. 880, 32
N.Y.S.2d 149, aff'd, 288 N.Y. 700, 43 N.E.2d 89 (1942). There, one of the grand jurors leaked
grand jury testimony to a target of the investigation and, constrained by overvhelming evidence
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the official stenographer are prohibited from revealing grand jury evidence,3 6
a grand jury witness is legally free to disclose his testimony. 37 Thus the media
now have one legitimate means of access to what, all agree, should be
inaccessible to them.
One practical way to cut off this spigot of information might be to place a
grand jury witness under the same restraint of silence as that imposed on
others, except that he should be permitted to relate his grand jury testimony
to his attorney as a confidential communication. But whether grand jury
disclosure is legitimate or not, as long as news reporters are willing to go to
jail rather than reveal their sources, it is hardly possible to make effective the
existing sanctions against public exposure of grand jury proceedings. There-
fore, one is led inevitably to make the publication of grand jury proceedings
before the filing of an indictment illegal and criminal. In this way, revelation
of sources by reporters is dispensed with as not relevant, for then publication,
rather than procurement, becomes the wrong. Although such a statutory
prohibition would inevitably be tested for its constitutionality, its survival of
the test might well be expected, if, as the Supreme Court has said "the press is
not free to publish with impunity everything and anything it desires to
publish. "38
Conclusion
That the present grand jury system should be reformed in some respects is a
proposition that has become almost universally accepted. The question is: To
what extent and by what means? In the presentation of proposals for change
and the arguments for and against them, which this book embodies, the
authors have performed a welcome service to the legal profession and the
public at large.
William R. Meagher*
against him, came before his fellow grand jurymen and admitted his guilt. Thereupon, they
authorized the filing of an information against him. However, the information was subsequently
dismissed, the court finding that during the grand jury proceedings resulting in the information a
special attorney general was improperly in the grand jury room. As far as is known, this violation
of the secrecy of the grand jury is the first and only reported case of its kind in the State of New
York. For a detailed history of this case, see J. Amen, Report of Kings County Investigation:
1938-1942, at 39-42.
36. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6e; N.Y. Penal Law § 215.70 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1977); N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 190.25 (McKinney 1975).
37. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6e; see, e.g., In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531
F.2d 600, 607 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
38. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972).
* A member of the Bar of the State of New York and Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham
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